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1 The woman’s self-portrait under examination here is not framed as such. Instead, it takes
shape in the dialogical  space established within a philosophical  correspondence – he
product of a series of depictions that work together to create an image of one of the
participants in the exchange as part of the construction of a shared knowledge. Elisabeth,
the Princess Palatine of Bohemia who lived from 1618 to 1680, is essentially known to the
seventeenth – century history of ideas for the correspondence that she cultivated with
Descartes from 1643 until his death in 1649, a period during which she lived in exile
following the overthrow of her father Frederick V. This correspondence played a very
important role in the evolution of Descartes’ thought, guided as it was by questions from
Elisabeth that promoted a rearticulation of soul and body as united within the human
being – a theoretical reorientation that produced The Passions of the Soul,  published in
1649. 
2 Our goal here is to show that,  if  the contribution of Elisabeth to the correspondence
produced this result, it is largely thanks to her deployment of a representation of herself
that places a high priority on the body – both the social body to which she belongs and
her own physical body. Evoking her own singular experience, she paradoxically grounds
her  coherence  and  credibility  as  a  philosophical  interlocutor  in  two  seemingly
unflattering epithets: “ignorant and intractable”. We will demonstrate how, despite their
apparently  negative  relationship  to  knowledge,  these  two  designations  highlight  the
ambivalent function of the body in Elisabeth’s writing – a body that is at once, as a source
of ignorance, an obstacle to the philosophical process, and, as a reality that resists theory,
an unavoidable challenge to this same process. 
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The Correspondence: A Space of Parity
3 Elisabeth’s self – portrait is inscribed both within the relationship between the princess
and the philosopher and in the philosophical correspondence itself. In other words, the
position and status of the two interlocutors structure the exchange on the one hand, and
on  the  other  are  neutralized  in  order  to  guarantee  the  successful  outcome  of  the
correspondence. Thus, from the outset, each participant begins by implicitly accepting
the portrait drawn of him or her by the other, in the process completing the image from
his or her own point of view. Elisabeth both implicitly assumes her role as princess, and
designates herself as a student:
I  learned,  with much joy and regret,  of  the plan you had to  see  me […];  I  was
touched equally by your charity in willing to share yourself with an ignorant and
intractable  person  and  by  the  bad  luck  that  robbed  me  of  such  a  profitable
conversation.[...] The shame of showing you so disordered a style prevented me, up
until now, for asking you for this favor by letter.1 (p. 61-62).
4 Descartes, on his side, implicitly assumes his role as philosopher and designates himself as
a simple subject: “The favor with which your Highness has honored me, in allowing me to
receive her orders in writing, is greater than I would ever have dared to hope”2 (p. 63).
Within this framework, the dialogue is presented by both Elisabeth and Descartes as an
exchange of favors, by means of which each recognizes the superiority of the other in the
position that defines him or her initially, and emphasizes his or her own inferiority in
this same context. 
5 On the occasion of this sharing of abilities, Elisabeth describes herself in the first lines of
the first letter as “ignorant and intractable”, a deficient writer with a “disordered” style.
She draws a self-portrait that is marked by a lack of ability – a weakness that becomes the
motivation for an appeal itself marked by a pedagogical disparity: a student seeks out a
teacher, the supposed bearer of a knowledge that the student herself does not have. In
contrast, Descartes, as part of his recognition of the social position of his correspondent,
does  not  delay  in  noting  the  relevance  of  her  remarks  and  the  acuity  of  her
understanding. In this way a framework of mutual recognition is established above and
beyond the possession of  a particular kind of  knowledge – a recognition of  a shared
aptitude for the exercise of reason that works to neutralize the initial social distinctions.
This  space of  parity,  forged in the correspondence,  accounts for  the quality and the
longevity of the exchange. 
6 Now, from the outset, Elisabeth takes up another discursive element – the therapeutic
dimension of the exchange:
Knowing that you are the best doctor for my soul, I expose to you quite freely the
weaknesses of its speculations, and hope that in observing the Hippocratic oath,
you will supply me with remedies without making them public.3 (p. 62)
7 This transition into the realm of medicine allows her to mitigate in a more profound way
the intellectual and social disparities that separate her from her correspondent: first, the
doctor holds a kind of knowledge that the patient lacks, but he is also at her service;
second,  the  doctor  has  the  authority  to  make use  of  his  tools,  both  theoretical  and
material, but it is the patient who guarantees their actual effectiveness, by putting them
to the test of her own experience. 
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8 In a more formal sense, this type of relationship brings about a need for confidentiality,
and highlights on the one hand the separation between an intimate and a public space
both marked by social constraints, and on the other the break with the social hierarchies
that the correspondents begin by acknowledging. In asking for this kind of protection for
their exchange, Elisabeth dramatizes the larger question of the safety of the mail and the
possibility that their letters might fall into the wrong hands. This subject is taken up
several times, as in the postscript to the letter dated May 24, 1645:
I realize now in what I send you, I am forgetting one of your maxims, which is never
to  put  anything  in  writing  which  can be  interpreted  badly  by  less  charitable
readers. But I have enough faith in the care of M. de Palotti that I know that my
letter will truly be delivered to you, and in your discretion that you will destroy it
by fire, because of the danger that it will fall into evil hands.4 (p. 91)
9 This concern even led the correspondents to consider the possibility of writing in code:
I have examined the code that you sent me and found it very good, but too long to
write a whole thought. And if one writes only a bit of a word, one would figure it
out by the number of letters [...].5 (p. 176)
10 But,  crucially,  where  the  content  of  the  letters  is  concerned,  this  reference  to  the
relationship  between  doctor  and  patient  inflects  the  framing  of  the  correspondence
considerably. Indeed, it transforms deficiency and weakness into an object of research,
rather than an obstacle to this research.  In this context,  the status of “ignorant and
intractable” is not so much a position of inferiority that Elisabeth must move beyond as a
challenge that Descartes must take up. And Descartes himself understands it in this way:
I have a very great obligation to your Highness in that she, after having borne my
explaining myself badly in my previous letter [...], deigns again to have the patience
to listen to me on the same matter [i.e. clarifying the relationship among the three
primitive notions: that of the soul; that of the body; and that of the union between
soul and body]. That is, I think, all of what your Highness has prescribed me to do
here.6 (p. 69)
11 This reply shows a reversal of the prescription: the prescription of the doctor, with which
he affirms his authority over the patient, is echoed by the prescription of the patient, in
which she gives him an object, and invites him to embrace a philosophical rigor that is
capable of taking account of this object in its singularity. 
12 From  here  on  out,  the  positioning  of  the  exchange  within  a  frame  that  is  at  once
philosophical and therapeutic casts a different light on the self-portrait of Elisabeth as
“ignorant and intractable”:  if  the assertion of  ignorance makes of  her an inadequate
disciple, hindered by her body in her quest for knowledge, her intractability renders her
the spokesperson of a singular experience that resists and requires the modification of
this very knowledge. 
 
“Ignorant”: The Body as Obstacle to Philosophy
13 Let us begin with ignorance. This characteristic, one of the first noted by Elisabeth in her
representation of herself, is doubly linked to the domain of physicality. First, it emerges
from her connection with a social body and the geographical constraints this body places
on her; second, it is one of the attributes that are proper to her own individual body. 
14 The self-portrait of Elisabeth thus presents her in context, as someone who, in her own
words, does not “have occasion to do as I like”7. Elisabeth sees her thirst for knowledge
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frustrated by the external conditions of her exile and her political circumstances, both of
which put limits on her freedom of movement and make it difficult for her to use her
time as she pleases, in particular by often preventing her from meeting with Descartes.
She explains: 
[...] I would rescind the resolution I have made to return there [to Holland], if the
interests of my family do not call me back, and I will wait here until the outcome of
the  treaties  of  Munster  or  some other  treaty  brings  me  back  to  my country.”8
(p. 162)
15 She reveals herself to be at the mercy of events that are beyond her control, and regularly
frustrate her desire to be both in places propitious for study and in the presence of the
person who could help her to overcome her ignorance. That which keeps her, despite
herself, from making this kind of progress in this domain also manifests itself in the more
intimate form of the family and of familial obligation: “[…] I do not at all see the electress,
my aunt, being in the mood to permit my return […].”9 (p. 158)
16 But this constraint, imposed upon her by the social body to which she belongs, functions
independently  from  the  political  circumstances  that  retain  her  in  a  particular
geographical place. In fact, Elisabeth evokes the different aspects of court life that are
incompatible with the full development of her philosophical quest for knowledge. This
life is lived as a form of insincerity; Elisabeth evokes the “[…] false praise […] in a place
where the ordinary way of conversing has accustomed me to understand that people are
incapable of giving one true praise […]”10 (p. 67), and she contrasts this empty flattery
with  the  kind  of  relationship  that  the  correspondence  with  Descartes  offers.
Furthermore, her condition as a princess in itself leaves her little time:
Now the interests of my house, which I must not neglect, now some conversations
and social obligations which I cannot avoid, beat down so heavily on this weak mind
with annoyance or boredom, that it is rendered useless for anything else at all for a
long time afterward: this will serve, I hope, as an excuse for my stupidity in being
unable to comprehend11. […] (p. 67-68)
17 Even should she work to fortify her “weak mind”, she describes herself as the prisoner of
a  structural  conflict  from  which,  she  notes  with  admiration,  others  are  capable  of
escaping, as she has heard is the case for Christina, Queen of Sweden:
But I wonder how it is possible for this princess to apply herself to study as she does
and to the affairs of the kingdom as well, two occupations that are so different, each
of which demand an entire person.12 (p. 181)
18 This incompatibility frequently translates itself into the mention of interruptions that
prevent  Elisabeth  from concentrating  on  the  philosophical  work  represented  by  the
examination of her experience in her letters to Descartes: 
It has been eight days since the bad humor of a sick brother prevented me from
making this request of you […].13 (p. 101)
[…] I am constrained to abide by the impertinent established laws of civility so that
I  do  not  acquire  any  enemies.  Since  I  began  writing  this  letter  I  have  been
interrupted more than seven times […].14 (p. 115)
19 These  elements  of  the  self-portrait  of  Elisabeth  as  an  exiled  princess  show that  the
inclusion of the individual in the social body works as an obstacle to the development of
philosophical research and contributes to the position of ignorance that she refers to in
her self-characterization. But this is not all. This external constraint reflects an internal
and individual constraint that is linked to the physical body: 
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But I confess that I find it difficult to separate from the senses and the imagination
those  things  that  are  continuously  represented  to  them in  conversation  and in
letters, so that I do not know how to avoid them without sinning against my duty.15 
(p. 93)
20 A difficulty that exists apart from the duties inherent in her position is here rendered
insurmountable  by them.  It  takes  considerable  effort  to  separate  the mind from the
bodily circumstances in which it operates, even for a person with as much talent for
metaphysical speculation as Elisabeth has, according to Descartes. 
21 Thus the princess presents her ignorance in its relationship to causes that she finds in her
own  person,  thereby  completing  her  portrait  with  the  addition  of  her  own  bodily
attributes: she is a woman, and she is sick. A gendered perspective appears explicitly in
her writing three times – each time in association with the idea of  constraint.  With
regards  to  Queen  Christina,  Elisabeth  brings  up  the  stereotypical  representation  of
women as  the  weaker  sex;  Christina  gives  her,  she  writes,  “the  idea  of  a  person so
accomplished, who defends our sex from the imputation of imbecility and weakness that
the pedants would have given it”16 (p. 181).  Elisabeth here rejects the presumption of
women’s weakness by presenting it as a form of pedantry; while it may be less widespread
at the moment when she is writing (hence the use of the imperfect “soulaient” [“would
have given it”]), it apparently still needs to be criticized. 
22 And,  in  fact,  this  opinion seems still  to  carry a  certain weight  for  Elisabeth herself,
because she takes up for her own purposes the association of femininity with weakness,
not as a social construction but as a physiological inevitability:
Know thus that I have a body imbued with a large part of the weaknesses of my sex,
so that it is affected very easily by the afflictions of the soul and has none of the
strength  to  bring  itself  back  into  line,  as  it  is  of  a  temperament  subject  to
obstructions and resting in an air which contributes strongly to this.17 (p. 88-89)
23 The “weaknesses of my sex” merge here with other causes to emphasize the disparity
between the  movements  of  the  body  and  those  of  the  soul,  thereby  preventing  the
mastery of one by the other. These declarations echo the third mention of femininity in
the letters, when Elisabeth seems to make reference to menstruation, which prevents her
from traveling:  “In addition,  the curse of  my sex keeps me from the contentment a
voyage to Egmond would have brought me.”18 (p. 94)
24 One can see here that Elisabeth deploys her gendered body as an element in her portrait
that serves to highlight not only her weakness and deficiency but the inferiority of her
position in relationship to knowledge. This theme nonetheless remains rather discreet
and intervenes in her writing only as one experience among others, much less salient
than her presentation of the ailing body. Elisabeth reaches out to Descartes as a doctor of
the body as well as of the soul,  and reveals throughout the correspondence different
symptoms, for which Descartes, in his answers, works to find a cure:
I  assure  you  that  the  doctors,  who  saw  me  every  day  and  examined  all  the
symptoms of my illness, did not in so doing find its cause, or order such helpful
remedies, as you have done from afar.19 (p. 88)
25 This  fragile  body  obliges  the  mind  that  it  shelters  to  run  the  risk  of  their  mutual
disappearance: 
If my life were entirely known to you, I think the fact that a sensitive mind, such as
my own, has conserved itself for so long amidst so many difficulties, in a body so
weak, would seem more strange to you […].”20 (p. 89)
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26 Her portrait of herself is that of a woman whose bodily ailments impede her goal of
putting into practice her philosophical principles; the physical dimension of the portrait
is an essential part of the representation of her engagement in a shared research project.
But it seems as if illness only works to emphasize the reality of the body as obstacle, a
reality that exists even in health. Here is Elisabeth writing about a moment and a journey
where she appears to be faring well:
[…] the air here is so pure. I  am here in much better health than I ever was in
Holland. But I would not want to have been here always, since there is nothing but
my books to prevent me from becoming completely stupid.21 (p. 163) 
27 The simple enjoyment of the healthy body does not represent, for her, the basis for an
improved intellectual  activity,  but  rather  comes  to signify  the  risk  of  being trapped
within this body without the external aid of the book. 
28 Whether she presents herself as a member of the court, as a woman, or as a person in
more or less ill health, Elisabeth locates the physical dimension of experience on the side
of impediments, ignorance, and stupidity. And she does this insistently, in a way that
recalls the demand that she makes of Descartes. One could even say that this body, which
bears such responsibility for the epithet of “ignorant” that Elisabeth ascribes to herself
(we note here that she makes no reference to the age difference between herself and
Descartes, which could function as a reason for this ignorance), becomes an essential part
of her contribution to the philosophical exchange. In this exchange, Elisabeth stresses the
experiences that become an obstacle to the practice of philosophy that she takes up. In
this way, the representation of her ignorance becomes, for her interlocutor, an appeal, as
well as a demand for greater philosophical rigor. 
 
“Intractable”: The Body as Appeal to Philosophy
29 Ignorance produced by the body thus becomes intractability, the resistance of experience
to theory that Elisabeth asks Descartes to help her mitigate—a kind disobedience, to echo
the  definition  of  the  term  given  by  Furetière  in  his  Dictionnaire  universel  of  1690:
“Farouche, revêche, qui ne veut recevoir aucune instruction ni rendre d’obéissance.”22
30 From  this  perspective, the  very  existence  of  the  exchange  between  Descartes  and
Elisabeth can become an instance of the latter’s intractability. In fact, the young woman
first takes up the philosophical problem of the articulation of the body and soul with
Regius, the Dutch philosopher and doctor. And it is Regius who advises her to approach
Descartes. Thus one could say that, having resisted instruction from a first teacher, she
turned to a second. Since Descartes is credited with greater authority, will she adopt a
position of  intellectual  submission with him? The qualifier  of  “intractable” comes to
reflect the considerable ambivalence of the place that she will occupy here: more than a
humble representation of her failings and her inferiority, the term designates the force of
an object that will not allow itself to be diminished, thereby constructing Elisabeth as a
rather Cartesian figure of contestation and autonomous self-assertion. 
31 In fact, her whole exchange with Descartes is fed by the intractability that she never
ceases to reveal through her persistence:
I would not dare to ask this of you if I did not know that you never leave a work
imperfect and that in undertaking to teach a stupid person, such as myself, you are
prepared for  all  the inconveniences  that  brings  you.  It  is  this  which makes me
continue and say to you that the reasons do not persuade me […].”23 (p. 123)
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32 Descartes  accepts  her  challenge,  which pushes  him into further  retrenchment  of  his
position, and is conscious of the possibilities for clarification that this resistance to his
instruction brings. To return to a passage that has already been cited, he declares: 
I have a very great obligation to your Highness in that she, after having borne my
explaining myself badly in my previous letter,  concerning the question which it
pleased her to propose to me, deigns again to have the patience to listen to me on
the same matter […].24 (p. 69)
33 One  would  no  doubt  be  wrong  to  see  here  only  the  rhetoric  of  politeness:  in  this
formulation  –  one  that  transforms  intractability  into  patience,  and  the  mastery  of
knowledge into a pedagogical weakness – he recognizes the philosophical coherence of
the  questions  raised  by  his  interlocutor  on  the  basis  of her  own  experience  –  an
experience wherein philosophy, like the doctor he has agreed to become, must find the
touchstone of its theoretical constructs. 
34 Placed as she is in this crucial position, Elisabeth demonstrates vis à vis Descartes an
intellectual confidence that derives from this ambivalent intractability: we thus see her
formulating more or less definitive judgements of the philosophical aptitudes of those
around her: “[…] there is no one else here who is reasonable enough to understand [your
works] […].”25 (p. 152) And we find her remarking,  in the context of an encounter in
Berlin, on “[…] the capability of the one I find to be the most reasonable of the doctors
here,  since he has a taste for your reasoning […].”26 (p. 156)  Even as she affirms the
dutifulness  that  makes  her  use  an understanding  of  Descartes’  œuvre  as  a  gauge of
intellectual quality, she establishes her own point of view and gives herself as a point of
reference,  thereby moving away from any position of  inferiority  that  her  avowal  of
ignorance may have implied. 
35 Elisabeth’s intractability expresses itself as an intellectual rigor that requires theory to
take particularity  into account27;  this  is  the thrust  of  the request  that  she makes  of
Descartes from the beginning, and that she reiterates with such persistence: “[…] I ask
you for a more precise definition of the soul than the one you give in your Metaphysics.”28
(p. 62) But she does not just raise a set of questions: throughout the correspondence, she
provides the material that is needed in order to arrive at answers. This evidence consists
of her personal, even intimate, experience – most notably the experience by means of
which she recognizes her body as an impediment to rational control over the course
taken by her life. 
36 This  deployment  of  the  self  in  the  service  of  a  shared  search  for  truth  meets  two
demands:  that  of  the  patient  who  awaits  a  cure  from  her  doctor,  and  that  of  the
philosopher who situates her singular experience in the more general content provided
by scientific knowledge. This is the origin of the singular tone of an exchange where the
narration  of  physical  symptoms  moves  out  of  the  therapeutic  (and  strictly  private)
register and acquires a more general purpose within the construction of knowledge. It is
in this context that Elisabeth takes the risk of appearing insignificant – or obscene – by
highlighting her intimate experience: 
I plan as well to be bled in a few days, because that has become a bad habit and I
cannot change it without getting a headache. I would fear giving you a headache
with  this  annoying  account  of  myself,  if  your  concern  for  my  health  had  not
brought me to it.29 (p. 159)
37 She takes this risk because this kind of account is justified as a source of experimental
data for scientific study, as she explains in another context:
“Ignorant and intractable”
Arts et Savoirs, 6 | 2016
7
While we were walking through an oak wood, […] we were overcome in an instant
by a sort  of  redness over the whole body […].  It  is  to be remarked that all  the
different remedies each imagined for an illness so new […] served for nothing. I give
you this account because I presume that in it you can find something to confirm
some of your doctrines.”30 (p. 174)
38 In  the  portrait  that  she  gives  of  herself,  Elisabeth positions  herself  as  an empiricist
philosopher positing her individual experience as the foundation for universal scientific
judgement, as do the other interlocutors of Descartes during this period, including Regius
(her first interlocutor), Gassendi, and Hobbes31.
39 In many senses, the correspondence bears witness to the priority given to experience. To
cite only two passages, Elisabeth declares of the passions:
For those who call the passions perturbations of the mind would persuade me that
the force of the passions consists only in overwhelming and subjecting reason to
them [sic], if experience did not show me that there are passions that do carry us to
reasonable actions.32 (p. 110-111)
40 And elsewhere: “[…] I have always found it better to avail myself of experience rather
than reason, in matters that concern [civil life] […].” (p. 134)33 But Elisabeth’s sensitivity
to the stubborn resistance of experience in the face of metaphysics reveals itself most
clearly in the means by which she transforms the ignorance produced by the body into an
intractability for which the mind must account. At the same time as she expresses a lack
of comprehension, she opens up another perspective by tirelessly affirming the objection
to theory that her body, and her experience of her body, represent. She thus positions
herself vis à vis Descartes, the putative holder of theoretical knowledge, as the bearer of
kind of practical, pre-theoretical knowledge, which Descartes himself acknowledges as
the impetus for new research. 
41 Does Elisabeth actively presume the priority given to the body – a priority that gives her a
certain status as an independent interlocutor – or does she endure it despite herself? In
considering the body as an impediment, and in painting a portrait of herself as a woman
struggling to overcome this obstacle, she displays her fundamental tendency to identify
herself as a mind and to separate mind from body; this is a tendency that she describes as
“rational”: 
If I were able to profit, as you do, from everything that presents itself to my senses,
I  would  divert  myself  without  difficulty.  It  is  at  this  moment  that  I  feel  the
inconvenience of being but a little rational. For if I were not so at all, I would find
pleasures in common with those among whom I must live and so be able to take this
medicine and have it do something.34 (p. 93-94)
42 In this passage, Elisabeth evokes the difficulty of putting into practice the following cure
(that Descartes proposes): 
[…] your Highness [should clear] her mind entirely of all sorts of unhappy thoughts,
and even also of all sorts of serious meditations concerning the sciences. She should
occupy herself by imitating those who convince themselves they think of nothing in
looking at the greenery of a wood, the colors of a flower, the flight of a bird, and
such things that require no attention.35 (p. 92)
43 Submerging thought in sensation in order to give the impression that the mind no longer
operates; keeping to a minimum those moments of intellectual concentration that give
access to a genuine grasp of the metaphysical separation of the two substances; relaxing
the mind to enjoy its union with the body and the pleasures of the senses: such is the cure
of Descartes the doctor.
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44 Now if  we set  aside  the  more  or  less  obligatory  euphemism (“a  little  rational”)  that
Elisabeth uses with her teacher to qualify her intellectual  abilities,  Elisabeth draws a
portrait of herself as distinguished by her capacity for abstraction – a capacity that, we
note in passing, isolates her both from her own body (with her difficulties in accessing
the pleasures of the senses) and from the social body to which she belongs (with her
difficulties in accessing the pleasures “in common with those among whom I must live”).
At this point, the correspondence presents us with a paradox: Elisabeth gives an account
of  the  “inconvenience”  of  being  cut  off  from  her  body,  and  it  is  Descartes  who
nonetheless pushes her to cultivate the immersion of the mind in the body. A paradox, in
the sense that it is Elisabeth, in their exchange, who highlights, as an argument against
metaphysics, the status of this body and her irreducible experience of it. 
45 Everything  proceeds  here  as  if  Descartes,  demonstrating  a  genuine  therapeutic
receptivity as well as a great deal of philosophical honesty, heard the appeal of Elisabeth
despite her own unwillingness to formulate it as such36. Aware as he is of her potentially
dangerous aptitude for metaphysics, he invites her to plunge herself into the body that
she offers up to him in writing, rather than to separate herself from the body that is a
source  of  so  much  complaint.  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  Elisabeth  remains  passive
throughout this process. Let us not forget that this entire approach is conditioned by the
representation of herself that she elaborates in writing. 
46 The  correspondence  represents  a  site  where  the  body  is  put  into  play  even  from a
distance.  This  distance,  which requires  Elisabeth to  articulate  her  physical  reality  in
words,  is  perhaps  the  condition  for  the  effectiveness  of  Descartes’  therapeutic
intervention: 
I  assure  you  that  the  doctors,  who  saw  me  every  day  and  examined  all  the
symptoms of my illness, did not in so doing find its cause, or order such helpful
remedies, as you have done from afar.37 (p. 88)
47 Descartes had likewise noted the possibilities inherent in their epistolary relationship:
[…] had I been able to be admitted the honor of paying you reverence […], I would
have had too many marvels to admire at the same time […]. This would have made
me less capable of responding to your Highness […].38 (p. 63)
48 This comment on the positive effects of neutralizing physical presence, far from being a
simple piece of rhetorical gallantry, underscores the importance of written mediation,
which represents for Elisabeth an opportunity to actively construct a representation of
herself. 
49 In conclusion, the history of philosophy recognizes the coherence and the philosophical
scope of the correspondence between Descartes and the Princess Elisabeth39. We note
here with interest how the self-portrait of the princess, with its emphasis on the body –
both the social body to which she belongs, and the individual body that constitutes the
human person – transforms the written articulation of  her experience into a  partial
solution to the very problems posed by this experience. At once obstacle to thought and
permanent appeal, the body represents a form of intractability that transforms ignorance
into philosophical potential: what could be more Cartesian?
50 Stubbornly, and under the protection of the therapeutic tie that binds her to her mentor,
Elisabeth has  the  courage  to  accept  her  body,  notwithstanding  her  own  “rational”
character, and in doing so she makes of Descartes the anti-metaphysical instrument that
she needs to make the leap that this integration of the body represents. She thus obliges
the  philosopher  to  move  from  a  consideration  of  the  metaphysical  ego  toward  a
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consideration of the whole human being who will become the subject of The Passions of the
Soul40. We can find here an effect of Elisabeth’s self-portrait, offered to Descartes in the
correspondence, as an ignorant and intractable woman.
NOTES
1. English translations taken from The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René
Descartes, Lisa Shapiro ed. and trans., Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2007. All
references to the correspondence in French are from: Descartes, Correspondance avec Élisabeth et
autres lettres,  Jean-Marie Beyssade and Michelle Beyssade ed. Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1989:
“J’ai appris avec beaucoup de joie et de regret, l’intention que vous avez eue de me voir [...],
touchée également de votre charité de vous vouloir communiquer à une personne ignorante et
indocile,  et  du malheur qui  m’a dérobé une conversation si  profitable.  [...]  La honte de vous
montrer un style si déréglé m’a empêchée jusqu’ici de vous demander cette faveur par lettre.”
May 16, 1643, p. 65.
2. “La faveur dont Votre Altesse m’a honoré en me faisant recevoir ses commandements par
écrit, est plus grande que je n’eusse jamais osé espérer.” May 21, 1643, p. 67.
3. “Vous connaissant le meilleur médecin pour [mon âme], je vous découvre si  librement les
faiblesses  de  ces  spéculations,  et  espère  qu’en  observant  le  serment  d’Hippocrate,  vous  y
apporterez des remèdes, sans les publier.”, May 16, 1643, p. 66. 
4. “En  relisant  ce  que  je  vous  mande  de  moi-même,  je  m’aperçois  que  j’oublie  une  de  vos
maximes, qui est de ne mettre jamais rien par écrit, qui puisse être mal interprété de lecteurs peu
charitables. Mais je me fie tant au soin de M. de Palotti, que je sais que ma lettre vous sera bien
rendue, et à votre discrétion, que vous l’ôterez, par le feu, du hasard de tomber en mauvaises
mains.”, May 24, 1645, p. 100. 
5. “J’ai examiné le chiffre que vous m’avez envoyé et le trouve fort bon, mais trop prolixe pour
écrire tout un sens; et si on n’écrit que peu de paroles, on les trouverait par la quantité de lettres
[…].”, October 10, 1646, p. 184. 
6. “J’ai très grande obligation à Votre Altesse de ce que, après avoir éprouvé que je me suis mal
expliqué en mes précédentes [...], elle daigne encore avoir la patience de m’entendre sur le même
sujet [i.e.  éclaircir l’articulation entre les trois notions primitives que sont l’âme, le corps, et
l’union de l’âme et du corps]. Ce qui est, comme je crois, toute la matière que Votre Altesse m’a
ici prescrite.”, June 28, 1643, p. 73. 
7. “n’a pas sujet de disposer de sa personne”, November 29, 1646, p. 189. 
8. “[...] je relâcherais [ma résolution] de retourner [en Hollande], si les intérêts de ma maison ne
m’y  rappellent,  et  attendrai  plutôt  ici  que  l’issue  des  traités  de  Munster  ou  quelque  autre
conjoncture me ramène en ma patrie.”, May 1647, p. 205.
9. “[…] je ne vois point que Madame l’Électrice, ma tante, soit en humeur de permettre mon
retour […].”, April 11, 1647, p. 200.
10. “[…] fausses louanges […] en un lieu où la façon ordinaire de converser m’a accoutumé d’en
entendre des personnes incapables d’en donner de véritables […]”, June 20, 1643, p. 71. 
11. “Tantôt  les  intérêts  de  ma  maison,  que  je  ne  dois  négliger,  tantôt  les  entretiens  et
complaisances, que je ne peux éviter, m’abattent si fort ce faible esprit de fâcherie ou d’ennui,
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qu’il  se  rend,  pour longtemps après,  inutile  à  tout  autre  chose:  qui  servira,  comme j’espère,
d’excuse à ma stupidité, de ne pouvoir comprendre[…]”, June 20, 1743, p. 71.
12. “Mais j’admire qu’il est possible à cette princesse de s’appliquer à l’étude comme elle fait, et
aux affaires de son royaume aussi, deux occupations si différentes, qui demandent chacune une
personne entière.”, December 4, 1649, p. 236. 
13. “Il y a huit jours que la mauvaise humeur d’un frère malade m’empêche de vous faire cette
requête[…].” August 16, 1645, p. 111. 
14. “[…] je suis contrainte de céder aux lois impertinentes de la civilité qui sont établies, pour ne
m’acquérir point d’ennemis. Depuis que j’écris celle-ci, j’ai été interrompue plus de sept fois […
].”, September 30, 1645, p. 137. See also April 25, 1646, p. 164: “I have been interrupted so often in
writing you that I am constrained to send you my rough draft […]”. (p. 134) [“J’ai été si souvent
interrompue,  en vous écrivant,  que je  suis  contrainte de vous envoyer mon brouillon .[…]”];
October 1646, p. 184: “I have so little leisure to write here that I am constrained to send you this
draft, in which you can see from the difference in pens all the times I have been interrupted.”
(p. 147) [“J’ai ici si peu de loisir à écrire, que je suis contrainte de vous envoyer ce brouillon, où
vous pouvez remarquer, à la différence de la plume, toutes les fois que j’ai été interrompue.”]
15. “Mais j’avoue que je trouve de la difficulté à séparer des sens et de l’imagination des choses
qui y sont continuellement représentées par discours et par lettres, que je ne saurais éviter sans
pécher contre mon devoir.”, June 22, 1645, p. 104. 
16. “l’idée d’une personne si accomplie, qui affranchit notre sexe de l’imputation d’imbécilité et
de faiblesse que MM. les pédants lui soulaient donner”, December 4, 1649, p. 236. 
17. “Sachez donc que j’ai le corps imbu d’une grande partie des faiblesses de mon sexe, qu’il se
ressent très facilement des afflictions de l’âme, et n’a point la force de se remettre avec elle, étant
d’un tempérament sujet aux obstructions et demeurant en un air qui y contribue fort.”, May 24,
1645, p. 98. 
18. “Avec cela, la malédiction de mon sexe m’empêche le contentement que me donnerait un
voyage vers Egmont.”, June 22, 1645, p. 105.
19. “Et je vous assure que les médecins, qui me virent tous les jours et examinèrent tous les
symptômes de mon mal, n’en ont pas trouvé la cause, ni ordonné de remèdes si salutaires que
vous avez fait de loin.”, May 24, 1645, p. 99. 
20. “Et je pense que, si ma vie vous était entièrement connue, vous trouveriez plus étrange qu’un
esprit sensible, comme le mien, s’est conservé si longtemps, parmi tant de traverses, dans un
corps si faible […]”, May 24, 1645, p. 99.
21. “[…] l’air  y est fort pur.  J’y ai  aussi  plus de santé que je n’avais en Hollande.  Mais je ne
voudrais pas y avoir toujours été, puisqu’il n’y a rien que mes livres pour m’empêcher de devenir
stupide au dernier point.”, May 1647, p. 207. 
22. Antoine Furetière, Dictionnaire universel contenant généralement tous les mots françois, tant vieux
que modernes, & les termes de toutes les sciences et des arts, 1690.
23. “Je n’oserais vous en prier, si je ne savais que vous ne laissez point d’œuvre imparfaite, et
qu’en entreprenant d’enseigner une personne stupide, comme moi, vous vous êtes préparé aux
incommodités que cela vous apporte. C’est ce qui me fait continuer à vous dire, que je ne suis
point persuadée […].”, October 28, 1645, p. 148. 
24. “J’ai très grande obligation à Votre Altesse de ce que, après avoir éprouvé que je me suis mal
expliqué en mes précédentes, touchant la question qu’il lui a plu de me proposer, elle daigne
encore avoir la patience de m’entendre sur le même sujet […].”, June 28, 1643, p. 73.
25. “[…] il n’y a personne ici d’assez raisonnable pour comprendre [vos œuvres] […]”, November
29, 1646, p. 191.
26. “[…] la capacité de celui que je trouve le plus raisonnable entre les doctes de ce lieu, puisqu’il
est capable de goûter votre raisonnement […].”, February 21, 1647, p. 196. 
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27. On  this  point,  see  the  article  of  Delphine  Kolesnik-Antoine,  “Élisabeth  philosophe:  un
cartésianisme  empirique,”  in  Élisabeth  de  Bohême  face  à  Descartes:  deux  philosophes?,  Delphine
Kolesnik-Antoine  and  Marie-Frédérique  Pellegrin  eds.,  Paris,  Vrin,  2015,  which  shows  how
Elisabeth requires Descartes to “ […] affronter la question de la possibilité de faire une science du
particulier. […] A plusieurs reprises, Elisabeth oppose ainsi à Descartes son cas ou son expérience
particulière  et  s’interroge  sur  la  capacité  de  la  règle  générale  à  rendre  raison  des  contre-
exemples qu’elle valorise (en elle, la tristesse diminue l’appétit,  etc.)” (p. 128); thus, “le bât a
donc  constamment  blessé,  pour  Elisabeth,  sur  la  même  question  de  savoir  comment  la
philosophie nouvelle, dans sa double dimension métaphysique et physiologique, est susceptible
de rendre raison des particularités des expériences quotidiennes que tout un chacun peut faire
de son incarnation” (p. 131). 
28. “[…] je vous demande une définition de l’âme plus particulière qu’en votre métaphysique”,
May 16, 1643, p. 65.
29. “Je  prétends  aussi  me  faire  saigner  en  peu  de  jours,  puisque  j’en  ai  pris  une  mauvaise
coutume,  que je  ne saurais  changer à  cette  heure sans en être incommodée du mal  de tête.
J’aurais peur de vous en donner par ce fâcheux récit de moi-même, si votre soin de ma santé ne
m’y avait portée.”, April 11, 1647, p. 201. 
30. “En nous promenant sous un bois de chêne,[…]il nous est venu en un instant une sorte de
rougeole par tout le corps […]. Et il est à remarquer que tous les différents remèdes que chacun
s’est imaginé pour un mal si nouveau, […] n’y ont rien servi. Je vous en fais le récit, parce que je
présume que vous y trouverez de quoi confirmer quelques-unes de vos doctrines.”, August 23,
1648, p. 224. 
31. On the relationship of Elisabeth’s arguments to the philosophy of the period, see Delphine
Kolesnik-Antoine, op. cit. She situates the thought of the princess in the framework of the “[…]
relations complexes et évolutives entre ce cartésianisme et le champ de la ‘nouvelle philosophie,’
qui  regroupe  Descartes  et  Bacon,  Gassendi  ou  Hobbes,  c’est-à–dire  ceux  qui  s’opposent  à  la
scolastique  sans  cependant  tomber  dans  la  croyance  aux  fantômes  (le  néoplatonisme  ou
l’hermétisme).  […]  Il  est  donc  possible  […]  de  dégager  des  filiations  entre  ses  arguments  et
d’autres  arguments  antérieurs,  et  de  singulariser  le  type  de  question  qu’elle  pose.
Incontestablement,  ses  objections  se  rattachent  à  la  mouvance  ‘matérialiste’  des  objecteurs
proches de Mersenne, de Gassendi, de Hobbes et de Regius” (p. 127-128). 
32. “Ceux qui les nomment perturbations de l’âme, me persuaderaient que leur force ne consiste
qu’à éblouir et soumettre la raison, si l’expérience ne me montrait qu’il y en a qui nous portent
aux actions raisonnables.”, September 13, 1645, p. 130. 
33. “[…] touchant la vie particulière,  […] je  me suis toujours mieux trouvée de me servir  de
l’expérience que de la raison […]”, April 25, 1646, p. 164. 
34. “Si  je  pouvais  profiter,  comme vous faites,  de tout ce qui  se présente à mes sens,  je  me
divertirais, sans peiner [mon esprit]. C’est à cette heure que je sens l’incommodité d’être un peu
raisonnable. Car si je ne l’étais point du tout, je trouverais des plaisirs communs avec ceux entre
lesquels il me faut vivre, pour prendre cette médecine avec profit.”, June 22, 1645, p. 102. 
35. “[…] il se faut entièrement délivrer l’esprit de toutes sortes de pensées tristes, et même aussi
de toutes sortes de méditations touchant les sciences, et ne s’occuper qu’à imiter ceux qui, en
regardant la verdeur d’un bois, les couleurs d’une fleur, le vol d’un oiseau, et telles choses qui ne
requièrent aucune attention, se persuadent qu’ils ne pensent à rien.”, May or June 1645, p. 102.
36. On the role played here by Descartes, see Yaelle Sibony-Malpertu, “Descartes thérapeute”, La
clinique lacanienne , n°19, 1/2011, p. 159-174. 
37. “Et je vous assure que les médecins, qui me virent tous les jours et examinèrent tous les
symptômes de mon mal, n’en ont pas trouvé la cause, ni ordonné de remèdes si salutaires que
vous avez fait de loin.”, May 24, 1645, p. 98.
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38. “[…] si j’eusse pu être admis à l’honneur de vous faire la révérence […], j’aurais eu trop de
merveilles à admirer en même temps […]. Ce qui m’eût rendu moins capable de répondre à votre
altesse […]”, May 21, 1643, p. 67. 
39. Recent  research  around  the  correspondence  bears  witness  to  the  latter’s  philosophical
significance, including most notably all the contributions to the volume (cited above) Élisabeth de
Bohême face à Descartes: deux philosophes?, op. cit.
40. Jean-Marie  Beyssade  makes  the  case  thusly  in  the  introduction  to  his  edition  of  the
Correspondence,  op. cit.,  p. 29-31:  “La  correspondance  entre  Descartes  et  Elisabeth  marque une
péripétie dans la philosophie cartésienne, le dernier mouvement par quoi elle s’est révélée à elle-
même[…]. C’est l’ego qui accède à sa forme ultime […]. L’homme prend le premier rang, non point
comme substance, mais comme personne.” 
ABSTRACTS
Depicting  herself,  in  the  correspondence  with  Descartes,  as  an  “ignorant  and  intractable”
woman, Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia, places a high priority on the body — a body that is at
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